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I.

INTRODUCTION

"Computer Law." It has a nice ring to it, but what is it? Is it a
field of law? Is it the law of an industry? Is it a discipline? It's proba
bly all three, but primarily, it's a challenge to established legal
concepts.
Traditionally, fields of law have been industry-independent, per
haps because of the training that lawyers receive in law school. Re
quired courses usually include contracts, torts, procedure, criminal
law, property, tax, and business law. Elective courses include such
esoterica as intellectual property, intemationallaw, antitrust, and the
• Partner, Bigelow & Saltzberg, Woburn, Massachusetts; Of Counsel, Warner &
Stackpole, Boston, Massachusetts. Past President, Computer Law Association; Editor,
Computer Law Service; formerly Adjunct Professor of Computer and Information Science,
Dartmouth College; A.B. Harvard University, 1950; J.D. Harvard University, 1953.
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Uniform Commercial Code.!
Lawyers often carry these fields into practice: trusts and estates,
taxation, business law, and civil litigation. In the commercial world,
however, clients don't care how a field of law is defined by the law
schools or by lawyers. Clients look for solutions to problems. Fields
of law are irrelevant to the client; management just wants the right
answers.
In any industry, competent service to clients requires a basic un
derstanding of many "law-school-defined" fields of law. For example,
the lawyer who represents a bank and trust company must be familiar
with the Uniform Commercial Code, the law of trusts, wills and es
tates, federal and state taxation, and the numerous laws and regula
tions that affect the client's operations. 2 Traditional courses do not
teach this. Fortunately, law schools have, to some degree, recognized
this fact and do offer some industry-oriented courses such as securities
law and insurance law. And some law schools now offer a course in
computer law. To the extent that these courses draw upon concepts
from traditional fields of law (and expose such concepts to rigorous
examination), the law, indeed society, will be well served.

II.

TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES THE LAW

Each new technological advance creates new legal problems and
calls for reevaluation of old concepts. For example, the law of copy
right in published works stems from the development of the printing
press. According to one respected source, 3 authors' rights were recog
nized on principles of natural justice long before Blackstone, but the
development of the first copyright law4 resulted from efforts by the
Stationers Company to perpetuate its monopoly of the right to print
(and to censor) whatever was published in England.
In many ways, the history of technology is the history of commu
nications. The development of the railroad led to the establishment of
the Interstate Commerce cOmmission. The development of the auto
1. Lest readers quarrel on whether the Uniform Commercial Code is esoteric, it is
my understanding that even such an alleged educational leader as Harvard Law School has
no course covering the entire Code. Some articles of the Code are touched upon in other
courses!
2. For example, a national bank may well be regulated by three different federal
agencies: the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Company, and
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Systems. Such banks may also, under cer
tain circumstances, be subject to de facto (if not de jure) regulation by state banking
departments.
3. A. LATMAN, CoPYIUGHT LAW (5th ed. 1979).
4. The Statute of Anne, 8 Anne c. 19 (1710).
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mobile led to the licensing provisions of the several states and even of
the federal government. S The development of the airplane led to the
Federal Aviation Administration and the late (and sometimes la-·
mented) Civil Aeronautics Board.
In the telecommunications field, the invention of telegraph, tele
phone, radio, and cable has led to regulation at the federal and state
level. The Interstate Commerce Commission was given authority to
regulate wire and radio communications as early as 1910. 6 While ra
dio regulation was assigned to the Federal Radio Commission in
1927,7 the ICC continued to regulate telecommunications on the inter
state level. In 1934, Congress brought both technologies back under
one agency (the Federal Communications Commission) through the
Communications Act of 1934. 8 At the same time, state regulation of
telecommunications was proceeding. 9 Cable TV is subject to both
state lO and federal 11 regulation.
New technology upsets balances established under old technol
ogy. And so it has been with the computer, now a pervasive machine,
although not yet fifty years old. The regulatory response has been, as
yet, comparatively minimal, but the technology is still new.
Yet the computer industry is still subject to many specific regula-:
tions. Any attempt to list each of these regulations, especially at the
state level, is a task for an encyclopedist, not a practicing attorney.
However, the following are offered as examples:
A.

Telecommunications

In 1966, the Federal Communications Commission began an in
quiry into the relationship between computers and telecommunica
tions.12 Following a tentative 13 and a final decision,14 which was
5. For example, the 55 mph speed limit.
6. R. Wiley, Competition and Deregulation in Telecommunications: The American
Experience, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE U.S.: TRENDS AND POLICIES 40 (1981).
7. Federal Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
8. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934Xcodified at 47 U.S.C. § 5
(1982»(repealed 1969).
9. See. e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 166 (West 1970) which is derived in part
from Stat. 1851, ch. 247.
10. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 166A (West 1976).
11. CATV Act, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1984).
12. In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com
puter and Communications Services and Facilities, Docket No. 16979, November 9, 1966,
7 F.C.C.2d 11, 1 C.L.S.R. 645 (1965).
13. 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 1 C.L.S.R. 665 (1970).
14. 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 1 C.L.S.R. 692 (1971).
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modified on appeal, IS the Commission entered a final order l6 in
1973-six and a half years after the inquiry began. But technology
marches on. By 1976, the Commission felt it necessary to begin a fur
ther inquiry into the relationship between computers and communica
tions,17 again followed by a tentative decision,18 a final decision,19 a
reconsideration,20 and a court appeal.2 1
The entire telecommunications world was turned upside down by
the government's antitrust action against American Telephone & Tele
graph Company in which a consent decree, issued in 1976,22 was mod
ified by a federal court in the District of Columbia in which a
subsequent action had been brought. 23
The Federal Communications Commission, state public utility
commissions, the Department of Justice, and the Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia are currently involved in regulating
or deregulating telecommunications, and attempting to apply the com
puter rules developed by the FCC to various telecommunications enti
ties. The result is much work for lawyers and many headaches for
business.

B. Computer-Produced Radio Interference
Computers emit radio frequency waves that may create problems
for those using other equipment. The Federal Communications Com
mission has issued regulations limiting the interference that computers
can produce through radio emissions. 24 In at least one case, a manu
facturer's liability for such emissions was held to be a jury question. 2s
C. Banking and Finance

In the banking field, there has been much federal and state legisla
15. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 3 C.L.S.R. 592 (2nd Cir. 1973).
16. 40 F.C.C.2d 293, 3 C.L.S.R. 867 (1973).
17. Amendment of § 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 61
F.C.C.2d 103, 5 C.L.S.R. 1381 (1976).
18. 72 F.C.C.2d 358, 6 C.L.S.R. 1434 (1979).
19. 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 7 C.L.S.R. 769 (1980).
20. 84 F.C.C.2d 50, 7 C.L.S.R. 1302 (1980).
21. Computer and Communications Indus. Assoc. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).
22. United States v. Western Elect. Co., 1 C.L.S.R. 24 (1956).
23. United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981)(motion to dismiss
after plainti1rs case denied); 47 Fed. Reg. 4166,4167 (1982)(Parties agreed to Modification
of Final Judgment); when final judgment was further modified, it was entered by the court,
552 F.Supp. 131 (D.C. Cir. 1982), a./J'd, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
24. 47 C.F.R. §§ 2.907, 15.810, 15.812, .15.830, 15.832 (1983).
25. Page County Appliance Center, Inc. v. Honeywell, 357 N.W.2d 71 (Iowa 1984).
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tion. Among the issues considered are a bank holding company's au
thority to establish a data processing subsidiary26 and the procedures
required for national banks to establish automated teller machines
(ATMs).27 Congress has enacted the Electronic Funds Transfer
Act,28 and the Federal Reserve Board has adopted Regulation E pur
suant thereto. 29 The most recent federal law affecting banking is the
amendment to the Criminal Code making unauthorized actions in
connection with computers of federally-insured institutions a criminal
offense.30
D.

Maintenance and Service

Are the maintenance personnel servlCmg government-owned
computers subject to the Service Contract Act of 1965?31 The Reagan
Administration's final rules exempting such employees from the appli
cations of the Act became effective in 1983. 32 But some kinds of com
puter services, such as data collection, processing, analysis,
keypunching, and key verifying are specifically covered by the Act. 33
E.

Copyright

From a permissible registration under the Rule of Doubt,34 com
puter programs clearly became subject matter for copyright, and right
ful owners of copies are given specified rights by statute. 35
The foregoing are merely a few areas in which computers have
encountered the law. Other areas include retail price marking regula
tion,36 application of state public records acts,37 and the heavy empha
26. Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.c. § 1841 (1841); and Regulation Y, specif
ically 12 C.F.R. § 225.118 (1984).
27. 49 Fed. Reg. 45,007 (1984).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1982).
29. 12 C.F.R. § 205.1 (1984).
30. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, ch. 47, 98 Stat.
2190 (1984) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2102). For a discussion offederallaw and unauthor
ized computer use see Soma, Legal Analysis of Electronic Bulletin Board Activities, 7 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 571, 606-08 (1985).
31. 41 U.S.c. §§ 351-358 (1982).
32. 9 C.F.R. § 4. 123(e)(I)(i) (1984).
33. 9 C.F.R. § 4.130 (1984).
34. Copyright Office Circular 31D, January 1965,6 C.L.S.R. 1167.
35. 17 U.S.c. §§ 101, 117 (1983); see also Bender, Software Protection: The 1985
Perspective, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 405 (1985); Stern, Section 117 of the Copyright Act:
Charter ofthe Software Users' Rights or an Illusory Promise?, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 459
(1985).
36. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 940 § 3. 13(1)(a)(1978), validated in Purity Supreme,
Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 380 Mass. 762, 407 N.E.2d 297, 7 C.L.S.R. 1212 (1980).
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sis upon privacy catalyzed by the computer. 38

III.

THE TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGE TO LEGAL CONCEPTS

Advances in technology throw doubt not only upon laws of sci
ence,39 but, with more frequency, upon the laws of man. The nature
of software provides an example of how the law may have to change to
accommodate fact.
Federal tax law has developed so that the government receives
more if a product is intangible, because no investment tax credit is
available, and amortization can be only on a straightline basis. State
.and local communities, on the other hand, levy sales, use, and personal
property taxes. But most states permit such levies only on tangibles.
Since software is information recorded on magnetic media for the
most part, it is not surprising that the federal government has held
that software is intangible, and state governments have often decided
that the same software is tangible. 40
But the problems of tangibility or intangibility of software extend
beyond taxation. For example, in one of the earliest computer crime
cases,41 the defendant attempted to peddle stolen computer programs
on punched cards. Defendant's counsel argued that the value of the
theft should be determined by the value of the punched cards, rather
than by the value of the information contained on the cards. After he
37. See, e.g., State v. Andrews, 48 Ohio St. 2d 283,358 N.E.2d 565, 6 C.L.S.R. 367
(1976).
38. The literature in the privacy area is extraordinarily extensive. See Solomon, Per
sonal Privacy and the "/984" Syndrome. 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 753 (1985). Professors
Arthur Miller of Harvard and Alan Westin of Columbia have gained national reputations
for their studies on privacy. Even this author has written in the field, from testimony
before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate. 92d Congress, March 10. 1971, printed in Federal Data Banks. Computers
and the Bill of Rights published by the Committee, Part 1, page 680, to a paper to be
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association July 17, 1985 in
London.
39. See Report of the Special Master, Newman v. Massinghoff. No. 83-0001 (D.D.C.
Sept. 28, 1984), in which the plaintiff's effort to patent an "energy generation system having
higher energy output than input" was denied by the Patent and Trademark Office because
it violated the second law of thermodynamics. The court, following the recommendation of
a special master (William Schuyler, former Commissioner of Patents), ordered the Patent
and Trademark Office to examine the patent application rather than just treat it as impossi
ble. See also Smith, An Endless Siege of Implausible Invention. SCIENCE. Nov. 16. 1984 at
817.
40. Bigelow, The Computer and the Tax Collector, 30 EMORY L.J. 357 (1981). For a
further discussion of the tangibility or intangibility of computer software. see McGee. Fi
nancial and Tax Accounting for Computer Software, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 651, 655
(1985).
41. Hancock v. State, 402 S.W.2d 906, 1 C.L.S.R. 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
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was convicted of grand larceny,42 the defendant brought a habeus
corpus action specifically on the grounds that the punched cards were
worth, at the most, $35 as scrap paper (since the cards were full of
holes). His petition was denied. 43
What is the status of software under the Uniform Commercial
Code? Section 2-105(1) defines goods to mean, "All things . . . which
are movable at the time of identification in the contract for sale
. . . ." Divers things, including natural gas,44 electricity,45 and the
compiling, editing, and publishing of pamphlets,46 have been held to
be "goods." Furthermore, an entire computer system (including the
software and installation) has been held to be a good. 47 However, con
tracts for the performance of data processing services are not contracts
for the sale of goods. 48 In a facilities management contract (a service
transaction), the software was held to be tangible and subject to re
plevin. 49 However, software is often licensed, rather than sold. Is a
license a good? In Tomb v. Lavalle,50 it was held that a liquor license
was a general intangible, not a good;SI therefore, the U.C.c. did not
apply to its sale. In Peterson v. Wildcat Mountain Jfanagement
Corp.,52 it was held that the plaintiff could not maintain an action for
breach of UCC warranty for injuries in a ski mishap, because the sale
of a ski lift ticket did not constitute the sale of a good.
Even if software is considered to be goods under the Uniform
42. [d. at 911.
43. Hancock v. Decker, 379 F.2d 552, 553, 1 C.L.S.R. 858 (5th Cir. 1967).
44. Pioneer Hi-Bread Com Co. v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 16 Ill. App. 3d 638. 306
N.E.2d 337, 14 U.C.c. Rep. 623 (1973).
45. Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 151 Ind. App. 176, 179,278 N.E.2d 608.609
10, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 333, 334 (1972); contra Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison
Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 328,196 N.W.2d 316, 317, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 977,978 (1972).
46. Lake Wales Publishing Co. v. Florida Visitor, Inc., 335 So. 2d 335, 336, 19
U.C.C. Rep. 1360, 1361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
47. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765, 769, 34 U.C.C.
Rep. 1088, 1090,7 C.L.S.R. 36, 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 604 F.2d 737,
7 C.L.S.R. 224 (2d Cir. 1979). But see Judge Freedman's doubts on this question in Samuel
Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp., No. 78-30777-F (D. Mass. filed Dec. 18, 1981) reprinted in
full in Saltzberg & Heffernan, Performance Claims in the Sales of Computers, 7 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 529, 554 (1985).
48. Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653, 655, 9 U.C.C.
Rep. 851, 852, 3 C.L.S.R. 58, 59 (D.S.C. 1970), affd, 443 F.2d 906,3 C.L.S.R. 64 (4th Cir.
1971).
49. F&M Schaefer Corp. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 430 F. Supp. 988, 992-93, 6
C.L.S.R. 177, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See Gordon & Starr, Software Development Contracts
and Consulting Arrangements: A Structure for Enforceability and Practicality, 7 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 487, 493 (1985).
50. 298 Pa. Super. 75, 444 A.2d 666, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 677 (1981).
51. [d. at 77-79, 444 A.2d at 667-68, 32 U.C.C. Rep. at 678.
52. 34 U.C.C. Rep. 1127 (D. R.I. 1982).
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Commercial Code, software may not be goods for other purposes. 53
For example, a patent license agreement has, under the Robinson-Pat
man Act, been held to be the sale of an intangible right of use rather
than the sale of goods. 54 Courts, however, are divided as to whether
electricity is a commodity under the Robinson-Patman Act. 55
The answer to these problems turns in part on the concepts of
tangibility and movability. Have such concepts outlived their useful
ness? Or perhaps we have come full circle. According to Radin, "The
distinction between movables and immovables despite its transcendent
practical importance was not made the basis of a legal classification"
in ancient Roman law. 56
But the distinction appears to be crucial to taxing authorities and
those who seek to apply Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Does it make any real difference whether software recorded on a cas
sette is a separate tangible item, rather than the mere representation of
intellectual property - the embodiment of what has been licensed by
the owner for another's use? Such a distinction is likely a concern
only to those who worry about the purity and the symmetry of the
law. Does the tangibility or intangibility of software for tax purposes
really matter? Pragmatically, the federal, state, and local governments
will interpret statutes to produce revenue. The fact that the same
computer program may be tangible under one law and intangible
under another will not delay the tax collectors on their appointed
rounds.
What these questions do illustrate is that new technologies - of
which computers are but one example - create anomalies in the law
and require each generation oflawyers (and law professors) to reexam
ine basic legal concepts. The lawyer whose practice is serving the
needs of an industry may become aware of the need for such reexami
nation before the scholar who is an expert in the law of sales or federal
taxation does. Technological advancement mandates that the teacher
and the practitioner interact. The articles that follow will, hopefully,
aid this dialogue.
53. See generally Note, Computer Programs as Goods Under the UCC, 77 MICH. L.
REv. 1149 (1979).
54. LaSalle St. Press, Inc. v. McConnick and Henderson, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004,
1005-06 (D.m. 1968), affd, 445 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1971).
55. Compare City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1181 (8th Cir.
1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1170; with City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power, 497
F. Supp. 1040, 1052, affd in part and remanded on other grounds, 662 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.
1981).
56. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW at 335 (1927). See also BoUVIER DIC
TIONARY 2265 (3rd ed. 1914).

